In his brilliant book, ‘Consciousness and the brain,’
Stanislas Dehaene gives an overview of neurological processes that give rise to
consciousness. He uses the definition of consciousness I like and, generally, I
agree with everything he has to say (especially with his critique of the
grotesque modern philosophical theories of consciousness towards the end of the
book). But there is one exception. In chapter 7, he unfortunately delves into a
morality-related topic and seems to make a tacit assumption that virtually
everybody else makes as well. And this is an assumption I do not like.
The question is: ‘is infanticide morally justified?’ The
quoted argument in favor is: “The fact that a being is (…) a member of species
Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather,
characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness (…). Infants
lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with
killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious beings.” Dehaene
strongly criticizes this point of view: “Such assertions are preposterous for
many reasons. (…) Although the infant mind remains a vast terra incognita,
behavior, anatomy, and brain imaging can provide much information about
conscious states. (…) We can now safely conclude that conscious access exists
in babies as in adults (…)” (p. 236-243)
Let us take a step back to see what is going on here. We see two people arguing if a thing (an infant in this case) deserves protection
as an object of moral behavior (let us quickly explain the notion of 'object of moral behavior': e.g. unlike humans, cockroaches are not objects
of morality so we can kill them with no remorse). Both sides tacitly agree that
a thing qualifies as an object of moral behavior if it has certain
characteristics of an adult human being and that it does not qualify as an object
of moral behavior if it does not have these characteristics. Both sides tacitly
agree that these characteristics revolve around mental capabilities of a healthy
human adult and gravitate towards something that both sides call consciousness.
What the sides disagree upon is whether a particular class of things (infants) has
consciousness or not. I side with Dehaene that babies have consciousness,
because philosophers whom he cites, as it often happens to philosophers, seem
to have no idea what they are talking about. However, it may surprise you that who I side with is actually irrelevant.
Connecting consciousness with morality seems to be very
popular. As I wrote in my previous post, vegetarians often use the argument
that animals are ‘conscious’ to propose that it is immoral to kill them. We can
also see it in the debates about consciousness, maintaining life-support for
vegetative-state patients, etc. However, virtually never, a person making such
claims explains why consciousness is the necessary and sufficient condition to
become an object of morality. And this omission goes unnoticed. Everybody in
these discussions seems to be in tacit agreement that this is the way to go:
you are conscious – you deserve a right to live, you are not conscious – you
can be treated instrumentally. (In some other debates the question is whether
the thing in question is capable of ‘suffering’ or ‘feeling’ rather than being conscious,
I do not want to go too deep in the nuance here, because it is irrelevant.)
Why is consciousness the necessary and sufficient condition
to become an object of morality? Why is it inherently wrong to kill a conscious
being? If you read my previous essay, you probably know the answers to these
questions. There is nothing objectively wrong in killing a conscious being,
whatever the definition of consciousness might be. It is subjectively wrong
from the point of view of the members of the Homo sapiens species, because they
(we) are hardwired to perceive it as wrong. In other words, we have an evolved
intuition that killing something that has consciousness is wrong because Mother
Nature hardwired us not to kill each other. But she did not care to make the
emotional mechanisms precise enough to spare us the ongoing confusion. Whatever
works is good enough.
The battle described at the beginning of this essay can be
deciphered in the following way. The two gentlemen have a certain concept
(consciousness) whose perception is hardwired in their brains to activate the
‘I care’ system. The two gentlemen then argue whether a certain stimulus (a
baby) should be associated with this concept (and thus activate the system).
But both of them skip the question whether this setup with the concept of consciousness invoking morality makes sense at all. None of the gentlemen makes any
arguments about objective – as opposed to emotional – reasons to kill or not to
kill infants.
Do such objective reasons exist? It may be surprising and
depressing for some people to learn that our intuitions about the world,
including the dearest and most deeply held feelings, are the works of natural
selection and are imprecise products of technological trade-offs that often
lead us astray. Our intuitions worked well to propel us to the status of the
dominant species on the planet Earth (in a sense that we technically have power
to destroy virtually all other species) but they also very efficiently generate
confusion when we try to understand the nature of reality. Using intuition is
not a pathway to truth. Rationality is.
But if we eliminate our intuitions as a source of morality,
what are we left with? Can we answer the question ‘is it okay to murder
babies?’ Can we even answer the question ‘is it okay to murder another human
being?’ Can we build a rational argument that is completely independent of our hardwired
intuitions, is fully rational, and provides guidance for the decisions we must
constantly make? Finally, if we ever encounter more intellectually advanced aliens, who do not rely on their instincts like we do, what kind of morality
should we expect from them?
Maybe it is possible to answer these questions in a
meaningful way. But this is a topic for a separate post. Stay tuned.
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